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Marker Correspondence, Not Processing Latency,
Determines Temporal Binding of Visual Attributes
the visual system: to correctly perceive the temporal
relationships between visual events [1].
How does the brain represent when events occur?
Shin’ya Nishida1 and Alan Johnston2,3
1Human and Information Science Laboratory
NTT Communication Science Laboratories
NTT Corporation This question can be addressed experimentally by
studying perceived simultaneity. Simultaneous visual3-1, Morinosato-Wakamiya
Atsugi-shi events can appear to occur at different times if they
differ in their stimulus intensity [2, 3], temporal continuityKanagawa 243-0198
Japan [4], or share of attention [5]. These observations have
generally been regarded as indicating time differences2 Department of Psychology
and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience in neural transmission or cortical processing, leading
to asynchronous awareness of the events. Recently, aUniversity College London
Gower Street striking visual phenomenon, color-motion asynchrony
[6], was added to the list of simultaneity illusions. WhenLondon WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom a green pattern moving upward and a red pattern moving
downward are alternated every 250 ms, most observers
find it difficult to tell which direction and color are shown
together. On the other hand, when the direction changeSummary
occurs about 100 ms earlier than the color change, the
observers reliably bind the two attributes (e.g., red andBackground: When simultaneous visual events appear
downward direction), confidently reporting that theto occur at different times, the discrepancy has generally
events appear to occur simultaneously (Figure 1A). Asbeen ascribed to time differences in neural transmission
in the case of other simultaneity illusions, this subjectiveor cortical processing that lead to asynchronous aware-
delay of motion change has been interpreted as indicat-ness of the events.
ing that the conscious perception of motion requires
more time than color, due to processing time differencesResults: We found, however, that an apparent delay
in modules specialized for each attribute (Figure 1B).of changes in motion direction relative to synchronous
This interpretation has led to an intriguing hypothesiscolor changes occurs only for rapid alternations, and
that different visual attributes are processed asynchro-this delay is not accompanied by a difference in reaction
nously in separate cortical areas and are perceivedtime. We also found that perceptual asynchrony de-
asynchronously without compensation [6–8].pends on the temporal structure of the stimuli (transi-
However, explanations of simultaneity illusions intions [first-order temporal change] versus turning points
terms of neural-processing delays have a logical pitfall[second-order temporal change]) rather than the attri-
in that they implicitly equate two time courses that needbute type (color versus motion).
to be distinguished [9–12]. One is a physical time course,
which indicates the time at which the observer’s brainConclusions: We propose that the perception of the
establishes neural representations of the events. Therelative time of events is based on the relationship of
time at which explicit descriptions of external eventsrepresentations of temporal pattern that we term time
are finally made available is thought to be related to themarkers. We conclude that the perceptual asynchrony
time at which the observer becomes aware of the eventseffects studied here do not reflect differential neural
[13]. The other is a subjective time course, the sequencedelays for different attributes; rather, they arise from a
of events as they appear to the observer. Although therefaulty correspondence match between color transitions
must be a strong correlation between these two timeand position transitions (motion), which in turn results
courses, whether they exactly match each other on afrom a difficulty in detecting turning points (direction
micro time scale remains controversial [9, 14, 15]. Inreversals) and a preference for matching markers of the
the case of color-motion asynchrony, it is doubtful thatsame type.
equating these two time courses is justified. It is difficult
to identify when the neural processing of a color-change
Background event or a direction-change event starts and finishes in
a distributed, continuously changing pattern of neural
Visual perception cannot be instantaneous. Signal activity. Even if brain events clearly signal the times at
transmission and information processing by sluggish which representations of external events are estab-
neural components inevitably introduces a certain de- lished, to utilize this information, there must also be a
gree of temporal delay between retinal stimulation and mechanism to encode these signals. In order to judge
the cortical awareness of events. Furthermore, the time the temporal order of two arbitrary neural events, the
required for visual processing is likely to depend on brain must have a mechanism to compare them and
stimulus properties and the cortical-coding mecha- anatomical connections of high temporal fidelity be-
nisms involved. This provides a challenging problem for tween the neurons to be compared. This meta-analysis
of neural processing places a high combinatorial burden
on the brain. In any case, the time taken to establish a3 Correspondence: a.johnston@ucl.ac.uk
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transitions in the motion sequence in place of turning
points (second-order temporal changes). The introduc-
tion of color-motion asynchrony at high alternation rates
results from a change in correspondence matching
brought about by temporal limitations on encoding
higher-order temporal change and linking tokens of dif-
ferent types.
An analogy may help clarify the distinction we would
like to draw between the brain-time explanation of
asynchrony we wish to challenge and the temporal cor-
respondence explanation we wish to develop. In the
brain-time theory, we can think of the specialized mod-
ules of the brain as singers in an Internet chorus. In
Britain, a Japanese singer will appear to be delayed
due to a transmission time lag. The brain-time theory
proposes that there is no compensation for these delays,
Figure 1. Perceptual Asynchrony of Motion and Color
and the result is apparent asynchrony. Our alternative
(A) Perceptual asynchrony of motion and color [6, 7]. When a green proposal is that all the singers are in the same place
pattern moving upward and a red pattern moving downward alter-
(no significant transmission delays), but time judge-nate with the indicated time course, it is hard to judge which color
ments are based on the temporal direction of links be-and direction are shown together. For motion and color to be seen
in phase, the direction change has to lead the color change by about tween corresponding key features. For the sake of the
100 ms for an interchange interval of 250 ms. The stimulus pattern analogy, let’s say verbs are the key marked features.
we used in the experiments was a pair of luminance-modulated Then, a listener will suffer the illusion that the Japanese
plaid patterns. singer appears to be delayed, because, in Japanese,
(B) Conventional account of the apparent motion delay in terms of
the verb is toward the end of the sentence.perceptual processing lag [6–8]. Motion takes longer to be con-
sciously perceived than color.
(C) New account in terms of correspondence matching of transitions.
Marker flags indicate transitions in the two sequences. The observ- Results
ers cannot perform the required task to match direction reversals
with color transitions due to difficulty in detecting the time of direc- Alternation Rate Dependency
tion reversals (turning points/second-order temporal changes) at The first line of evidence against the interpretation of
rapid alternations. They instead use more salient position transitions
color-motion asynchrony in terms of processing latency(first-order temporal changes) as features (time markers) for cross-
differences is that color-motion asynchrony dependsattribute binding.
critically on the rate of stimulus change (Figure 2). We
found that robust perceptual asynchrony occurred for
stimulus changes at a rate of once every 250 ms, whichrepresentation of an external event will depend upon
many factors and should prove to be an unreliable esti- was close to the values used in the original report [6].
When the alternation rate was slowed down, however,mate of the real time of events. The event-time from
“brain-time” theory is fraught with difficulties [9–12]. the apparent asynchrony was gradually reduced and
almost disappeared at a rate of once every 2000 ms.The interpretation of color-motion asynchrony in
terms of processing delay is not compatible with a num- Subjects could accurately judge the temporal order of
a color change and a direction change for nonrepetitiveber of our experimental findings described below. We
propose an alternative account of color-motion asynch- single changes. The observation that the asynchrony
effect is rate dependent not only accounts for why werony (Figure 1C). Our results suggest that there is not a
substantial difference in the time it takes for the brain are not normally aware of color-motion asynchrony but
also raises questions about the idea that the illusionto establish representations of color change and motion
direction change. The visual system, however, cannot reflects a processing time difference between color and
motion, which, at least in its simplest version, woulddirectly compare these physical time courses; instead,
it has separate mechanisms for temporal judgments. In predict apparent motion delay regardless of the rate of
alternation.David Marr’s [16] theory of low-level image description,
the primal sketch, spatially localized tokens represent- However, we are assuming that processing time de-
lays are fixed. One might argue that the observed effectsing elements of a spatial pattern are used as the input
to grouping processes (now often called mid-level visual of alternation rate can be explained if the hypothetical
differential processing delays of the two attributes areprocesses), which combine tokens of the same type to
form coherent regions in what Marr called the full primal only seen at high alternation rates. Subjects, however,
could accurately judge the order of occurrence betweensketch. Here, we extend this idea to temporal processing
and use the term temporal marker to refer to temporally a single change and a change embedded in a rapid
sequence of alternations, whether the judgment waslocalized representations of salient temporal features.
We propose that color-motion asynchrony results from within or between attributes (asymmetric temporal order
judgment: Figure 3). This result does not support a differ-the action of mid-level temporal grouping processes.
To be specific, our hypothesis ascribes this simultaneity ential rate dependency of processing time. Crucially, it
shows that the apparent delay at high alternation ratesillusion to biased cross-attribute linkage of time markers
of the same temporal type: transitions (first-order tem- is not due to the alternation rate per se. This effectively
voids any simple explanation for color-motion asyn-poral changes) in the color-change sequence map to
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Figure 2. Rapid Alternation Is Critical for Per-
ceptual Color-Motion Asynchrony
(A) Subjects judged whether the oscillation of
color and that of direction were perfectly in
phase. The percentages of the in-phase re-
sponses, obtained for subject Y.K. with the
interchange interval of 250 and 2000 ms, are
plotted as a function of the time lag. The trian-
gle indicates the point of perceptual syn-
chrony, estimated from the peak of the best-
fit Gaussian function. It is largely shifted to
the left (i.e., apparent motion delay) for the
interval of 250 ms, but it is close to the phys-
ical synchrony point for the interval of
2000 ms.
(B) Subjects made a temporal order judgment
between a single change of color and direc-
tion. The percentage of the color-first re-
sponses is plotted as a function of the time
lag. The triangle indicates the point of per-
ceptual simultaneity at which the color-first
response was 50% in the best-fit cumulative
Gaussian function.
(C) Perceptual delay of motion relative to
color estimated from the synchronous judg-
ment of repetitive changes plotted as a func-
tion of the interchange intervals, together
with the delay estimated from the temporal
order judgment of single changes. Different
symbols indicate different subjects. Although
a large perceptual delay for motion was found
for rapid repetitive changes, it disappeared
for slow repetitive changes and for single
changes.
(D) The standard deviation plotted in the
same format. In spite of the systematic
change in delay, the response variability re-
mained nearly constant. The error bars in (C)
and (D) represent a 95% confidence interval
estimated by a bootstrap technique.
chrony based in the temporal tuning characteristics of accompanied by a corresponding difference in reaction
time. In this experiment, subjects were asked to presslow-level visual mechanisms. The apparent delay occurs
as a consequence of the requirement to make a compar- a button as soon as a target (motion direction or color)
appeared in a pseudorandom stimulus sequence inison across two different sequences at high alternation
rates. Note also that, for alternations significantly faster which stimuli were selected from one of three distracters
(Figure 4A). Button-press latencies were found to bethan once every 250 ms, the judgment of the motion-
color temporal relationship is almost impossible, even almost identical for motion and color under the stimulus
conditions we used (cf. [18–21]). To measure subjectivewhen the alternations themselves are clearly visible. A
similar failure of attribute association was reported for time differences in a situation in which we know the
processing time of attribute change (as measured byluminance-orientation or color-orientation binding when
the two attributes changed in separate objects [17], but reaction time) is, to a first approximation, identical, we
presented the same motion direction target sequencethe temporal limits on color-direction binding are fairly
low even when the changes are instantiated in the same together with a pseudorandom color test sequence in
which colors were selected from one of four alternativesobjects. These observations indicate that, except in a
few cases in which two attributes are presumably coded (Figure 4B). Subjects had to report the color displayed
in the test sequence when the target direction was pre-in combination explicitly by early stages [17], cross-
attribute temporal binding requires not only the detec- sented. It was found that the probability of apparent
concurrence peaked for the test color presented 65–95tion of changes in two attributes, but also an extra atten-
tion-demanding, time-limited comparison process. ms after the target direction. Under the reversed con-
dition (color targets), the probability of concurrence
peaked for the motion test presented 99–113 ms beforeReaction Time Inconsistency
the color target, indicating a perceptual delay that can-The second line of counterevidence against the pro-
not be ascribed to slow attention shifts from target tocessing delay hypothesis is that the subjective asyn-
chrony in the temporal binding of color and motion is not test [22]. The results indicate that, under conditions in
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Task Dependency
The asymmetric temporal order judgement task (Figure
3) shows that rapid direction changes do not always
appear to be delayed. Here, we introduce a performance
measure of the perceived time of stimulus alternation
that provides confirmatory evidence of this. In these
experiments, we used synchronous motor tasks that
reflect the subjective temporal relationship between vi-
sual stimuli and motor responses. In one experiment,
subjects were asked to press a button and hold it down
during the downward phase of a repetitive 2 Hz direction
alternation. It was found that subjects’ button responses
for motion change lagged the true point of simultaneity
by around 100 ms (Figure 5). Subjects’ button presses
were approximately synchronous for color changes re-
gardless of the alternation rate. Also, some subjects’
button presses synchronized with the direction changes
at slow alternation rates. All of this is consistent with
the data from the perceptual judgment tasks. These
results appear to suggest that temporal relationships
were judged veridically for button presses, color
changes, and direction changes at the low alternation
rate, although rapid direction changes appeared de-
layed relative to these events.
However, although this response delay to motion
change appeared to reflect the perceptual delay as de-
scribed above, it vanished when we switched to a
slightly different task. In the second experiment, we
found that subjects could accurately synchronize theFigure 3. Alternation Rate, Per Se, Had Little Effect on the Temporal
Order Judgment unseen movement of a computer mouse with the move-
ment of the visual stimulus when asked to move the(A–D) Subjects made an asymmetric order judgment between a
single isolated change and a change embedded in a rapid alternation mouse forward and backward in time with the upward-
sequence (a fifth change to red or to downward) for various combina- downward movement. This synchronization would be
tions of color and motion changes. For each condition, the right impossible if perception of the motion direction change
graph indicates the apparent delay of the second stimulus (S2)
sequence was substantially delayed. To explain syn-relative to the first stimulus (S1), estimated from the point of percep-
chronization of mouse movement with these rapid direc-tual simultaneity.
tion changes, one might propose that the proprioceptive(E and F) Some of these delays should indicate large positive values
if the disagreement between (E) accurate temporal order judgment perception of the rapid direction changes of the mouse
for single changes and (F) large apparent motion delay for rapid was also delayed, but, if so, this argument should also
changes reflects rate dependency of the processing delays. The apply in the case of the button-press experiment, which
results, however, did not support this prediction, showing fairly ac-
also requires a repetitive response to the same predict-curate temporal order judgments for any combinations of slow and
able movement and in which we reported an approxi-rapid changes. The error bar represents a 95% confidence interval.
mately 100-ms motion direction change delay.
The difference in the results between the two syn-
which there was no difference in response latency to chrony tasks may appear counterintuitive, but it seems
targets, subjective simultaneity required a very substan- to agree with the phenomenology of the tasks. For rapid
tial motion sequence advance relative to the color se- direction changes, although alternation of two directions
quence, even though both tasks required identification is seen, there is no subjective transient signal that clearly
of the same target stimulus appearing in the same stimu- indicates the time of the direction change. We suspect
lus sequence (Figure 4C). this is why the subjects could make a forward mouse
If we accept that the subjective judgement of percep- movement in synchrony with the phase of upward mo-
tual asynchrony measured here, which can be as large tion but could not press a button in time with the begin-
as 100 ms, reflects neural-processing time differences, ning of a direction change. We think that subjects cannot
then it is difficult to understand why it is not reflected reliably encode the time of direction changes due to a
in reaction time. The possibility that delayed motion lack of salient features that mark the change events,
perception is completely compensated for by fast post- and this failure in turn leads to perceptual asynchrony.
perception processing is not only anatomically unlikely,
but it is also incompatible with the finding that response
latencies were nearly identical for single changes of Transitions versus Turning Points
We have ascribed errors in judging the temporal relation-color and motion. This is because, when perceptual
asynchrony does not occur, such compensation should ship of color and direction changes to the temporal
structure of these changes and the need to comparemake response latencies much shorter for motion than
for color. two alternating sequences, rather than processing time
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Figure 4. Dissociation of Reaction Time and
Perceptual Simultaneity
(A) Comparison of manual reaction latency
between motion and color. Subjects were re-
quired to press a mouse button immediately
if a target (red color or downward motion)
appeared in a pseudorandom stimulus se-
quence. The results indicate that the re-
sponse latencies were almost equal for mo-
tion (green bar) and color (red bar).
(B) Subjective simultaneity judgment be-
tween motion and color. The same target
stimulus sequence that was used for the la-
tency measurement was presented on one
side of the display, and a test sequence was
presented on the other side. Subjects had to
decide which test stimulus was concurrent
with the target. In the bottom graph, the ab-
scissa shows the time of test onset relative
to target onset (negative for the test ahead of
the target), and the ordinate is the probability
that the subject chose a stimulus as con-
current. The smooth curve is the best-fit
Gaussian function, whose peak, indicated by
a triangle, is the estimate of the subjective
point of simultaneity. The results indicate the
apparent motion delay relative to color for
both the motion target condition (green) and
color target condition (red).
(C) Comparison of the magnitudes of percep-
tual motion delay obtained in the two tasks.
The error bars in (A) and (C) represent a 95%
confidence interval.
differences for different attributes. Here, we character- high temporal rates (Figure 1C). For rapid alternations,
transitions of position (i.e., motion) become brief, facili-ize these changes in more detail. Whereas a color
change is a first-order temporal change (first-order de- tating their use as time markers in place of turning
points, and are linked to transitions in the color se-rivative of color with respect to time), direction reversal
is a second-order temporal change (second-order deriv- quence. This is, at least in part, we believe, because of
temporal limits on the allocation of attention needed toative of spatial position with respect to time). In this
paper, we use the terms transitions for first-order link transitions and turning points. There is also consid-
erable evidence showing that changes in speed (sec-changes and turning points for second-order changes
(to emphasize the difference between the meaning of ond-order changes) are poorly detected by the visual
system [24–27]. Given that neural sensors specializedfirst-order/second-order used here and the well-estab-
lished first-order/second-order categorization distin- for temporal change exist only for transitions, but not
for turning points, it is reasonable that the visual systemguishing luminance- and, say, contrast-defined stimuli
in the space and motion domains [23]). We consider only can use only transitions at high temporal rates. This
explanation of apparent asynchrony does not requiretransitions and turning points of nontemporal attributes
that can be defined at one point in time (e.g., luminance, any delay of the motion response relative to the color
response. (Note that our notion of a time marker has nocolor, and position), thus a transition requires measure-
ments at just two points in time, while a turning point direct relationship with the visual marking mechanism
proposed by Watson and Humphreys [28] for efficientrequires measurements at three points. When color
changes and direction reversals are correctly marked selection of new events.)
If our hypothesis is correct, it is to be expected thatand compared, accurate temporal judgments of color
and motion change can be made. We assume that the perceptual asynchrony will depend on the temporal
structure of stimulus sequences (transitions versus turn-visual system can use both transitions and turning
points, but it tends to make a match between transitions, ing points) rather than their attribute type (color versus
motion). To test this, we measured the point of percep-instead of between transitions and turning points, at
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Figure 5. Synchronous Button Press and Mouse Movement to Figure 6. Temporal Matching Experiment for Combinations of Tran-
sitions and Turning Points of Color and PositionRapid Stimulus Direction Changes
(A) The task was to synchronously press a button while the stimulus (A) The stimulus sequence in a space-time format for the C1P1,
C1P2, C2P1, and C2P2 conditions, where C1P2, say, indicates awas downward, or to move a hand-held computer mouse forward
and backward in synchrony with the stimulus movements. combination of color transition and position turning point (motion
direction reversal). Subjects reported (forced choice) whether the(B) Red squares and the left ordinate indicate the probability of
button press for the phase of downward motion. Green circles and stimulus was in phase (as illustrated) or out of phase.
(B) The probability that a subject made an in-phase response forthe right ordinate indicate the speed of mouse movement, with
positive value being assigned for backward mouse movement to each stimulus as a function of the time difference of the attribute
changes. The smooth curve is the best-fit truncated cosine function,be matched with the downward stimulus motion. Both variables are
plotted as functions of time within a direction alternation cycle of the zero phase of which, indicated by a line segment, is the estimate
of subjective point of simultaneity.500 ms. The stimulus direction changed from upward to downward
at time zero. The time course of the button press probability indi- (C) Perceptual delay for position change relative to color change
estimated from temporal matching data for four subjects. The colorcates a response delay of about 100 ms, while the time course of the
speed of the mouse movement indicates nearly perfect synchrony and position changes were made within the same plaid patterns
(filled symbols), or separately in two plaids (open symbols). Thebetween the stimulus and response. The error bar represents a 95%
confidence interval. results indicate an apparent delay of turning points relative to transi-
tions regardless of the types of stimulus attribute. The error bar
represents a 95% confidence interval.
tual synchrony for all combinations of transitions and
turning points of color and position using a cross-attri-
bute matching task (Figure 6A). The transition of color is expected, since, in both cases, the tasks could be
accomplished by matching features of the same type.(C1) was an abrupt change between two colors, and the
turning point (C2) was the reversal of a gradual change Apparent motion delay is expected for the combination
of color transitions and position turning points (C1P2)between the two colors. The transition of position (P1)
was an abrupt change between the two positions, which as before. The critical prediction is that an apparent
color-change delay should occur for the combinationcould be judged only by the jump direction, and the
turning point (P2) was a motion direction reversal. As in of color turning points and position transitions (C2P1).
These predictions were indeed supported by the experi-the original demonstration of perceptual asynchrony of
color and motion [6], we systematically varied the rela- ment (Figures 6B and 6C). This indicates that the key
factor in perceptual asynchrony is the temporal proper-tive phase of the color and position changes, then asked
the subjects to judge their temporal relationships. For ties of the stimuli, not the specialist neural system acti-
vated. Note that this result is an empirical justificationinstance, for the C2P1 stimuli, subjects judged whether
the color was changing from red to gray or from gray of our characterization of motion reversal as a second-
order change in position in this context rather than ato red when the position was top or bottom. According
to our hypothesis, for the combination of transitions first-order change in motion direction.
Closely examining Figure 6C, however, one can notice(C1P1) or turning points (C2P2), no perceptual delay
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are almost synchronous with motion direction changes.
The point of subjective simultaneity is thus strongly bi-
ased toward alignment of the same type of stimulus
change regardless of the type of stimulus attribute.
By applying the same rule for cross-modality judg-
ments, one can account for the results for synchronized
behavioral responses (Figure 4). For the synchronous
button press, the subjects were asked to synchronize
transitions of finger/button position with turning points
of visual stimulus position. For the mouse movement,
on the other hand, they were asked to synchronize tran-
sitions of hand/mouse position with transitions of visual
stimulus position. Thus, subjects’ tendency to link
changes of the same temporal type for both body and
visual stimuli leads to asynchronous responses in the
former case but synchronous responses in the latter
case.
Discussion
Color-motion asynchrony does not indicate that the pro-
cessing time for motion is longer than for color. Turning
points (second-order temporal changes including mo-
tion direction change) generally appear delayed relative
to transitions (first-order temporal changes including
color changes) when they are compared in rapid alterna-
tion (Figures 6 and 7). One cannot ascribe this apparent
Figure 7. Temporal Matching Experiment for Combinations of Tran- delay to longer neural-processing times for turning
sitions and Turning Points of Luminance with Color Transitions or points than those for transitions since direction changes
Position Turning Points were not subjectively delayed relative to color changes
(A) The stimulus sequence for the C1L1, C1L2, P2L1, and P2L2 at slow alternation rates (Figure 2). The possibility that
conditions, where C1L2, say, indicates a combination of a color
alternation rate itself changes the magnitude of the tem-transition and a luminance turning point. The luminance transition
poral delay was rejected (Figure 3). Also, motion changewas an abrupt change in the plaid mean luminance, and the lumi-
could appear to be delayed by about 100 ms without anance turning point was a reversal between linear luminance incre-
ment and decrement. The range of luminance change was 5–15 consequential increase in manual response time (Fig-
cd/m2. ure 4).
(B and C) The results are shown in the same format as Figure 6. We suggest that the apparent delay of turning points
Again, the results indicate apparent delay of turning points relative
is a result of an error of subjective temporal judgmentto transitions regardless of the types of stimulus attribute.
rather than a temporal asynchrony of visual awareness
or temporal distortion of immediate visual experience.
We recognize that relative information about segregatedthat perceptual synchrony for C1P1 and C2P2 occurred
at a point for which position (motion) changed slightly objects/events is not directly computed in parallel but
requires the establishment of a perceptual strategy orearlier than color. Bias in the same direction was found
for C1P2 and C2P1. Although we cannot reject the possi- perceptual routine to extract the information. To make
a relative judgment, an event must be marked and identi-bility that this residual effect might reflect processing
delays, attentional gating [22] could also account for fied as a reference for subsequent comparison with
other events. The asynchrony effect arises because, atthe observed bias if the subjects always judged the
timing of (less salient) color change using the timing of rapid alternation rates, it is difficult to mark and link
turning points to transitions, but it is still possible to(more salient) position change as the reference. In fact,
the bias was slightly reduced when the strategy to use match the transitions in the two temporal sequences.
In fact, the maximum delay was about a quarter cyclethe color changes as a reference was facilitated by
changing color and position in separate objects (open of the alternation (125 ms), as would be expected from
this theory. Even turning points in rapid alternation cansymbols).
The importance of temporal structure was further sup- be accurately located when subjects pay attention to a
single change in the sequence (Figure 3). Attending toported by the results of experiments using luminance
change. The results (Figure 7) suggest that abrupt transi- a turning point might enhance its signal strength, influ-
ence feature selection, and/or allow subjects to infertions of luminance level appear to be almost synchro-
nous with abrupt color transitions, while they appear to the location of a missing turning point from adjacent
transitions. In any case, problems in marking turningbe largely ahead of motion direction changes. In con-
trast, luminance turning points (the point of change be- points at high alternation rates reflect, in part, con-
straints on the dynamic allocation of attention. At alter-tween linear luminance increments and decrements) ap-
pear to largely lag behind abrupt color transitions but nation rates higher than a few hertz, temporal judgments
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neural-processing time theory in that we propose that
the target neural activity used for temporal coding is
time locked to events and dissociated from the encoding
of the content of events. It does not need to be located
at the cortical area that plays a major role in the analysis
of the event content, nor need it reflect the time of
establishment of the event representation. These spe-
cialist mechanisms for temporal analysis are expected
to draw on neural events early in the processing hierar-
chy so as to mirror, as far as possible, the temporal
order of external events (cf. [14]). Our hypothesis thus
Figure 8. Spatial Analog of Perceptual Asynchrony
evades inherent problems involved in the processing
(A and B) In both (A) and (B), turning points (peaks and troughs of
time theory (see “Background”). The idea of special neu-the triangular wave) and color transitions (border between red and
ral systems for temporal coding was suggested by visualgreen) are in phase between top and middle gratings, while the
motion processing, in which direction-sensitive neuronsbottom grating was misaligned by an amount corresponding to a
quarter cycle of (B). Alignment is easily judged for the low alternation encode spatiotemporal relationships (e.g., something is
rate (A) but is difficult for the high alternation rate (B). moving from left to right), while other neural systems
encode the detailed appearance (e.g., color, texture) of
the object [32, 33]. Although the experimental evidence
become impossible even when the stimulus changes thus far does not clearly point to a mechanism for encod-
are still detectable (temporal crowding). This can be ing the temporal relations, it is possible that spatiotem-
ascribed to a difficulty in marking salient transitions or poral comparators analogous to local motion detectors
a failure in using them properly for temporal binding. [34–36] or global synchrony detectors [37] could encode
Our argument that asynchrony is based on temporal this information. We speculate that the cross-attribute
grouping can be neatly demonstrated using a spatial linkage between transitions could be implemented by a
version of transition/turning point correspondence. The simple mechanism that computes cross-correlation of
alignment of color transition edges (border between red early neural responses, while the linkage between transi-
and green) with luminance turning points (peaks and tions and turning points may result from an attention-
troughs of a triangular wave) is not difficult when the demanding feature matching mechanism. It is intriguing
alternation cycle is low (Figure 8A), but the appropriate that cross-attribute temporal binding is similar to cross-
alignment is not unambiguously determined for high attribute apparent motion in various respects, such as
spatial alternations (Figure 8B) [29]. Which parts of the low temporal resolution, sensitivity to stimulus saliency,
display appear aligned depends on how features are and strong influence of attention [38–42].
identified and matched, rather than how the spatial map We believe that manual reaction time primarily reflects
of brightness and chromatic change is aligned. For Fig-
the objective time at which a decision by the perceptual
ure 8B, there seems to be a more natural alignment
system becomes available to the motor system; it is
between the color pattern and the lower luminance pat-
unlikely to be totally unrelated to the time taken to pro-
tern. In this case, color transitions are linked to lumi-
cess task-relevant visual information. Our hypothesisnance transitions rather than to luminance turning
accounts for why the response latency can be largelypoints. We believe that a similar principle governs tem-
dissociated from the subjective judgment of simultane-poral judgment, although matching between transitions
ity. Besides the present study, dissociations betweenprevails in temporal cases due to difficulty in detecting
these chronometric measures have been reported fortemporal turning points.
comparisons across sensory modality [10, 43] and spa-A recent report of temporally asymmetric binding of
tial frequency [10] and for spatial cueing [44]. Unlike incolor and motion direction in contingent aftereffects [30]
the present case, some previous studies [10, 44] showargues against our proposal that perceptual asynchrony
that temporal judgments tend to be more accurate thancannot be ascribed to neural delay; however, this asym-
predicted from differences in response latency. This pat-metry could be attributed to a temporal response profile
tern of results is generally expected from our theory,difference between the two attributes [11]. An intriguing
since judgments based on time markers should be lessreversal of subjective temporal order of the cutaneous
affected by processing delays. Note, however, that sub-stimuli delivered to each hand due to arm crossing [31]
jective asynchrony occurs without a difference in stimu-demonstrates a different type of temporal misjudgment
lus temporal structure (e.g., [5, 43]), and, in many cases,(mislabeling) that also cannot be ascribed to neural de-
the two temporal measures show positive correlations.lay. Our position is close to the multiple drafts model of
Agreements are particularly high for luminance [3] andsubjective timing [9] and the postdiction theory of visual
wavelength [18, 45] manipulations. We believe that thisawareness [12, 15] in that the subjective time course of
dependency reflects the temporal properties of periph-events is regarded as a result of the brain’s interpretative
eral neural responses that can affect both the temporalprocesses.
codes for subjective judgments and the total processingWhat is the neural basis of the process of temporal
time of the system. Revealing the relationship betweenjudgment mediated by time markers? We conjecture
subjective temporal judgments and various responsethat the brain encodes temporal relationships of events
latencies will lead to greater insight into the neural basisbased on the temporal pattern of the neural activity
elicited by those events. This view is distinct from the of temporal judgments.
Time Marker Theory of Temporal Binding
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with the green/upward phase. The single change from green to redConclusions
(or from upward to downward) took place within 150 ms of the fifthAn apparent delay of changes in motion direction rela-
change from green to red (or from upward to downward) in thetive to synchronous color changes cannot be ascribed
repetitive sequence. The subject was asked to judge which of these
to a processing delay in neural systems specialized for two changes occurred first. No sign was presented to specify the
motion. Perception of the relative time of events is based fifth change; thus, the subject had to count the number of changes.
n  30.on the comparison of representations of temporal fea-
tures (time markers). Since transitions (first-order tem-
Response Latency Measurement for Color/Motion Targetporal changes) become more salient than turning points
To appropriately measure the reaction time difference between color(second-order temporal changes) at rapid alternation
and motion under the temporal conditions for which a robust per-
rates, the comparison process results in a correspon- ceptual asynchrony effect is obtained (Figure 4A), we used a pseu-
dence match between transitions of color and position dorandom alternation of color or motion direction with an inter-
occurring at different times. This leads to a temporally change interval of 250 ms. The time of appearance of the target
could not be predicted. In each trial, one of three colors (green,biased linkage across stimulus modalities, which is per-
blue, yellow) or one of three directions of motion (upward, leftward,ceived as temporal asynchrony.
rightward) appeared in a pseudorandom order in a pair of plaids. A
target (red or downward) appeared once at the third from last posi-Experimental Procedures
tion in the sequence (2–4 s after the onset of the sequence). The
same stimulus could not appear consecutively. Subjects were re-General
quired to press a mouse button immediately when they detectedA pair of luminance-modulated plaid patterns were placed on either
the target. The reaction time from the onset of the target to theside of a fixation bull’s-eye. The plaid size was 4  4, and the
button press was recorded. n  60.gap between the two plaids was 4. Each plaid consisted of two
sinusoidal gratings of 1.4 c/ (unless otherwise noted), having 50%
Subjective Simultaneity Judgment between Motioncontrast and oriented 45 and 45 from the vertical. The plaid
and Color in Pseudorandom Sequencespattern was stationary or moved at 6/s (unless otherwise noted)
In each trial of the experiment (Figure 4B), the same target stimuluswithin a stationary border. The mean luminance was either 5 cd/m2
sequence that was used for the latency measurement was presented(green plaids), or an isoluminant value (other color plaids, and gray
on one side of the display, and a test sequence was presented onbackground,) as determined by the minimum motion technique [46].
the other side. In the test sequence, one of four colors or directionsThe CIE (1931) chromaticity coordinates were (x 0.279, y 0.598),
appeared in a pseudorandom order, with the restriction that the(x  0.625, y  0.343), (x  0.139, y  0.055), (x 0.491, y  0.446),
last four stimuli differed from one another. The test sequence wasand (x  0.285, y  0.317), for green, red, blue, yellow, and gray,
temporally offset relative to the target sequence byT, which rangedrespectively. The stimulus pattern was displayed at a 120 Hz refresh
from 225 to 0 ms. Subjects had to decide which of the four testrate on a color monitor driven by a VSG 2/3 (Cambridge Research
stimuli was concurrent with the target. For a given T, we couldSystems). The subject binocularly viewed the display in a dimly lit
compute the four probabilities of choosing the test stimuli presentedroom at a distance of 71 cm. One of the authors (S.N.) and additional
at T–250 ms, T ms, T  250 ms and T  500 ms. n  30.naı¨ve subjects participated. They all had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity.
Synchronous Button Press and Mouse Movement
A pair of gray plaids were presented on both sides of the fixationSynchronous Judgment for Repetitive Changes
point (Figure 5). They changed motion direction between upwardIn each trial of the experiment (Figure 2A), a stationary plaid pre-
and downward. The direction change interval was 250 ms. The sub-sented on one side alternated in color between green and red, and
ject was asked to synchronously press a button while the stimulusa moving plaid presented on the opposite side alternated in its
was downward, or to move a hand-held computer mouse forwarddirection between upward and downward. (An auxiliary experiment
and backward in synchrony with the stimulus movements. Sinceindicated that changing color and direction within the same patterns
the subjects had to look at the stimulus in the monitor at all times,did not alter the results.) The relative temporal phase was varied
they could not see the movement of their hand, but they could hearfrom trial to trial. The subject was asked to make a yes-no judgment
the click upon the press of the button. During a trial, the state ofabout whether the two oscillations were perfectly in phase. “In
button or speed of the mouse movement was recorded. Each trialphase” was defined as “when the color is red, the direction is down-
lasted for 15 s, but the first 5 s was discarded in the analysis.ward.” The stimulus was presented until the subject made a judg-
For the button press response, the button press probability wasment. A total of 30 judgments were made for each phase (n  30).
computed for each trial, then averaged over trials. For the mouseThe interchange interval (the alternation rate) was 250 ms (2 Hz),
movement response, the speed of the mouse movement was nor-500 ms (1 Hz), 750 ms (0.67 Hz), 1000 ms (0.5 Hz), or 2000 ms
malized by the fastest speed in the trial, then the mean speed was(0.25 Hz). The subject was instructed to observe several alternations
computed for each trial. A total of 20 trials were conducted for eachbefore making a judgment.
task.
Temporal Order Judgment for Single Changes
In each trial of the experiment (Figure 2B), a green stationary plaid Temporal Matching for Combinations of Transitions
and Turning Points of Color and Positionwas presented on one side, and an upward moving plaid was pre-
sented on the opposite side. After 1–3 s from the stimulus onset For each block, color and position were changed in a pair of plaids
(consisting of 0.7 c/ gratings) with a given combination of type of(this duration was randomly varied), the first plaid changed color to
red, and the second plaid changed direction to downward. They changes (Figure 6). We varied the relative temporal phase of color
and motion changes from trial to trial. Subjects made a two-alterna-disappeared 1 s after the change in color. The relative timing of the
color and direction changes was varied from trial to trial. The subject tive forced choice on the relative phase. The interchange interval
was 250 ms. For the C1P1 stimuli, subjects judged whether thewas asked to judge which change occurred first. n  30.
color was gray or red when the position was top or bottom (which
could be judged only by the direction of a quarter-cycle jump of theAsymmetric Temporal Order Judgment between Single
and Repetitive Changes plaid). For the C1P2 stimuli, subjects judged whether the color was
gray or red when the motion direction was upward or downwardIn each trial of the experiment (Figure 3), a repetitive alternation of
color or motion direction was presented on one side, and a single (8 /s). For the C2P1 stimuli, subjects judged whether the color was
changing from red to gray or from gray to red when the positionchange of color or motion direction was presented on the opposite
side. The repetitive stimulus was presented for five and half oscilla- was top or bottom. For the C2P2 stimuli, subjects judged whether
the color was changing from red to gray or from gray to red whentions, with an interchange interval of 250 ms, starting and ending
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the motion direction was upward or downward. The stimulus was levels revealed by response latencies to changes in different
visual attributes. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 265, 2321–2325.presented until the subjects made a judgment. n  20–30. For the
experiment shown in Figure 7, the method was similar except for 22. Reeves, A., and Sperling, G. (1986). Attention gating in short-
term visual memory. Psychol. Rev. 93, 180–206.the stimulus. The interchange interval was 250 ms for S.N. and 500
ms for the other subjects. n  10. 23. Chubb, C., Olzak, L., and Derrington, A. (2001). Second-order
processes in vision: introduction. J. Opt. Soc. Am. A Opt. Image
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